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Abstract: Newspapers are considered to be important providers of information,
culture and language, and are taxed at a reduced VAT rate in most countries. This
paper shows that such a policy may a¤ect newspaper di¤erentiation and lead to
greater media bias. We further show that a reduced-rate VAT scheme may lead
to higher newspaper prices and less investment in journalism. These results are
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sided markets, where they raise revenue both from readers and advertisers.
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1 Introduction
Media rms may not always have incentives to accurately report the truth. Selective
omission and choice of words may convey a picture that looks very di¤erent from
one newspaper to another although the underlying story is the same. This is what is
known as slanted news or media bias. Such media bias has historically been a¢ liated
with political parties or ideologies. It is also well documented in psychology and
economics that slanted news may be driven by consumers who have a preference for
information that is likely to conrm their prior beliefs.1
In this paper we shall argue that slanted news in the sense of left-wing or right-
wing prole of content, say, may be driven by public policy. In many countries media
regulation is based on the presumption that media rms are important providers of
information, language, and culture that strongly a¤ect politics.2 This is the case
with government regulation of news media in the United States, and has also been
the attitude among most European countries (see Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006b).
Such views have led most countries to tax newspapers at a reduced ad-valorem tax
rate compared to that for other goods and services (in the continuation we shall use
the terms VAT and ad-valorem tax interchangeably). The stated goal of this policy
is to reduce newspaper prices and increase the incentives to invest in journalism.3
We show that this policy may be counterproductive, in the sense that a reduced-
rate VAT scheme may lead to higher newspaper prices and less investment in journal-
ism. However, this does not necessarily mean that the VAT rate should be increased.
Indeed, we show that a tax increase would make the newspapers more dependent
on advertising revenue, increasing their incentives to aim for the mass market. This
might reduce media pluralism, and violate public goals of having a di¤erentiated
1For documentation in psychology see Nisbett and Ross (1980). For evidence in economics see
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006a, 2006b, 2007); Mullainathan and Schleifer (2007).
2Examples of papers that link media rms to the political process and democracy are Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2004) and Strømberg (2004).
3In Germany, for example, newspapers are subject to a rate of 7% in contrast to the regular
rate of 19%, whilst countries like the UK, Denmark, Finland and Norway exempt newspapers from
the VAT altogether. Newspapers are also either fully or partially exempted from sales taxes in a
number of U.S. states.
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newspaper industry.
In order to bring forward these results we take into account the fact that printed
newspapers derive income from two groups of customers: advertisers and readers.4
Since advertisers nd it more attractive to place ads in a newspaper the larger its
circulation, newspapers are a prime example of a platform in a two-sided market.5
To embed the two-sidedness of the print media business we use a Hotelling-type
framework with two competing newspapers and a continuum of consumers uniformly
distributed along the unit line. The newspaperschoice of location on the line can be
interpreted as describing their proles. We consider a three-stage game. At stage 1
each newspaper decides on its location on the Hotelling line and how much to invest
in journalism. At stage 2 the ad level is determined, and ad-revenue is assumed to
be proportional to the number of readers. Then at stage 3 the newspapers compete
in prices. A reduction in the ad-valorem tax rate for newspapers implies that the
protability of selling newspapers increases relative to the protability of selling
advertisements. As a consequence, it becomes less imperative for the newspapers to
attract a large audience in order to sell advertising space. Instead, each newspaper
wants to increase its earnings from the reader side of the market. It can do so by
choosing a prole that di¤erentiates it further from its competitor; thereby each
newspaper gains market power that allows it to charge a higher price to readers.
The greater market power in turn makes it less important for each newspaper to
invest in journalism. In this sense a reduced VAT rate harms consumers; newspaper
prices increase and the quality levels fall.
Our paper relates to two strands of literature. Most closely related to our paper
is a growing literature on the price-setting behavior of rms in two-sided markets.6
This literature typically abstracts from taxation issues. The literature on commodity
4The share of advertising in total revenue in the press industry di¤ers across countries, but is
typically around 50 percent. See Albarran and Chan-Olmsted (1998).
5See Evans (2003a,b) or Rochet and Tirole (2003) for examples and classications of two-sided
platform rms.
6See for instance Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), Crampes, Haritchabalet and Jullien (2005),
and Armstrong (2006).
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taxation, on the other hand, does not consider two-sided markets.7 One exception
is Kind, Koethenbuerger and Schjelderup (2008), who compare the e¤ects of ad-
valorem and specic taxes on a good sold by a monopoly in a two-sided market.
They nd, contrary to popular beliefs, that a lower ad-valorem tax may increase
the price and reduce sales, while a per-unit subsidy (or a lower specic tax) has
the opposite e¤ect. They do not consider how taxes inuence di¤erentiation and
investment incentives. More closely related to our analysis is Gabszewicz et al
(2001, 2002), who use the Hotelling model to analyze how the size of the advertising
market a¤ects the political proles of newspapers. They nd that the larger the
ad-market, the more important it is for the newspapers to moderate their political
prole. Thereby the newspapers are better able to serve the mass market and raise
income from the advertising market.
Furthermore, there is a growing literature on the impact of media diversity on
truth-telling. If a reduced rate VAT regime leads newspapers to either become
conservative or left-wing, say, it matters if such di¤erences in stance a¤ect truth
telling. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) use a "persuasion game" and nd that as long
as there is at least one information provider in every state of nature that wants the
truth to be told, the true story will be revealed to individuals with access to all
providers of news. Using a very di¤erent model Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005)
show that individuals who combine news from di¤erent sources can form accurate
beliefs about an event even though the stories told may be biased. In an empirical
paper Gentzkow, Glaeser, and Goldin (2006) study the Crédit Mobilier scandal
of 1878, where bribes were paid to US Republican congressmen in exchange for
favorable votes. They show that Republican newspapers in the end reported just as
many facts as Democratic newspapers. One interpretation of their nding is that it
over time became too costly in terms of reputation and credibility for Republican
papers to suppress information. Our contribution is to show that public policy may
create media bias.
This paper is organized as follows. The formal model is presented in Section 2,
7E.g., Keen and Delipalla (1992), Dierickx, Matutes and Neven (1998) and Anderson et al
(2001a, 2001b). For a survey, see Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).
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and Section 3 derives the newspapersequilibrium prices, investments in journalism
and prole choices. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of changing the ad-valorem tax
rate levied on newspapers and ads. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We employ a standard Hotelling model with two competing media rms each selling
a newspaper to readers and ad-inserts to advertisers. The readers are uniformly
distributed along the unit line according to their political view; a consumer who is
located at point 0 is extremely left-wing, whilst a consumer located at 1 is extremely
right-wing. Consumers with more moderate views are located closer to the center of
the unit line. We assume that each reader buys the newspaper which has the prole
which best corresponds to his political view, other things equal.
The political proles of Newspaper 1 and 2 are given by the locations x1 and 1 
x2; respectively, as illustrated in Figure 1. Throughout, we assume that newspaper
2 is located (weakly) to the right of newspaper 1; (1  x2)  x1: The newspapers
are perfect (horizontal) substitutes if x1 + x2 = 1 and maximally (horizontally)
di¤erentiated if x1 = x2 = 0: More generally, an increase in x1 and/or x2 means
that the newspapers become less horizontally di¤erentiated, and vice versa. The
further away a newspaper prole is from the ideal positionof a specic reader,
the smaller is his utility from reading it. We model this utility loss by a distance
cost parameter, t > 0.
0 1
x1 x2
Figure 1: Location of the newspapers
In addition to choosing its prole, each newspaper can also make investments in
journalism in order to become more attractive to the readers. Letting pi  0 denote
the price and ji  0 the journalistic quality level of newspaper i = 1; 2; the utility
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level of a consumer located at point x who buys newspaper i is given by
U = v + ji   pi   t(di   x)2; (1)
where d1 = x1; d2 = 1   x2; and v is a positive constant: The squaring of the last
term in (1) means that distance costs increase quadratically with the distance from
the most preferred location.8
Consumers have unit demand, and we assume that the parameter v is su¢ ciently
large to ensure complete market coverage. This means that each consumer buys
either newspaper 1 or newspaper 2. Let ~x denote the location of the consumer who
is indi¤erent between buying newspaper 1 and newspaper 2; v+j1 p1 t(x1 ~x)2 =
v+ j2  p2  t(1 x2  ~x)2: Consumers located to the left of ~x (x < ~x) consequently
prefer newspaper 1, while consumers to the right of ~x (x > ~x) prefer newspaper 2.
From this we nd that demand Di for newspaper i equals
Di = xi +
1  x1   x2
2
+
p i   pi
2t(1  x1   x2) +
ji   j i
2t(1  x1   x2) ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (2)
Advertisers may buy inserts in either or both newspapers, and newspaper is
gross advertising income is given by Ai: The willingness to pay for advertising de-
pends on the number of readers and the advertising volume. We follow Peitz and
Valletti (2008) and Anderson and Coate (2005) in assuming that newspaper i faces
a simple downward-sloping demand curve for advertising per reader. More speci-
cally, letting ri be the price of advertising per reader and ai the advertising volume,
we have
ri =   ai (;  > 0): (3)
With Di readers, we consequently nd that advertising income equals
Ai =

  ai
1 + T
  cA

aiDi; (4)
where cA  0 is the marginal cost of adverts, and T  0 is the ad-valorem tax on
advertising. A higher  or a smaller  can be interpreted as though the size of the
ad market has increased:9
8It is worth pointing out that the linear way in which quality enters the utility function achieves
simplicity without compromising the qualitative direction of our results.
9An increase in  means that the willingness to pay for advertising becomes higher, while a
reduction in  is equivalent to an increase in the number of advertisers.
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The prot level of newspaper i is given by
i =

pi
1 + 
  cN

Di + Ai  K(ji); (5)
where   0 is the ad-valorem tax rate on newspaper sales and cN  0 is the
marginal cost of printing and distributing the newspaper. The last term in (5)
represents the costs of investing in journalism, with K 0(ji) > 0. We further assume
that the cost function is convex (K 00(ji) > 0), such that it is more expensive to
achieve a given increase in the perceived journalistic quality the higher the quality
level is as the outset. The obtain closed-form solutions, we shall in the following let
K(ji) = j
2
i =2: The constant  > 0 is assumed to be su¢ ciently large to fulll all
second-order conditions for prot maximization.
3 Equilibrium
The timing of the game turns out to be important when analyzing the e¤ects of tax
policy in Hotelling models. Regularly, it is assumed that newspapers set advertising
levels and newspaper prices simultaneously at the nal stage of the game. Such a
timing is useful to highlight the fact that an increase in the size of the advertising
market may lead media rms to reduce newspaper prices; by doing so they will
attract a larger number of readers and thus increase revenue from the advertising
market. However, due to the peculiarities of the Hotelling model, the media rms
would pass on 100 % of any additional revenue from the advertising market to the
consumers in the form of lower newspaper prices. This has the implication that
the newspapers would actually be completely indi¤erent to the size of the advertis-
ing market. The peculiarities of the Hotelling model further implies that the size
of marginal production costs does not inuence rm protability in a symmetric
equilibrium (unless the consumersreservation prices are too low to make it unprof-
itable to serve everyone). Along the same lines it can be shown that if advertising
levels and newspaper prices are set simultaneously, the media rms would also be
indi¤erent to whether the government imposes taxes on ads and/or newspaper sales.
In our view, these predictions do not ring true. Media rms seem to care about
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the size of advertising markets, and they seem to prefer low rather than high VAT
rates on newspaper sales. To capture this, we shall below model a sequential game
with three stages, where at stage 1 each media platform decides on its newspaper
prole and investments in journalism. Then at stage 2 they choose advertising levels,
while newspaper prices are determined at stage 3. Since newspaper prices and thus
the number of copies sold are the outcome of the nal stage, the sequencing of the
game implies that the media rms cannot commit to a certain number of readers or
write contracts with advertisers which depend on the number of copies. We believe
that this ts well with the actual working of the newspaper market, where advertisers
buy advertising space based on some anticipation on how many readers they will
reach. In the formal model we assume that the advertisers correctly anticipate the
number of readers in equilibrium. In practice a proxy for such anticipations is the
use of daily, weekly, monthly and yearly circulation numbers that newspapers in
most countries make available for advertisers.
Stage 3. Solving the game backwards, at stage 3 each newspaper takes proles,
investments in journalism and advertising levels as given when it decides on the
newspaper price. Using (2) and (5) to solve @i=@pi = 0 we nd
pi = cN(1 + ) +
t (1  xi   x i) (3 + xi   x i)
3
+
ji   j i
3
; i = 1; 2: (6)
Equation (6) shows that the price of newspaper i depends positively on how
horizontally di¤erentiated it is from its rival and on its journalistic quality level
(@pi=@xi < 0 and @pi=@ji > 0). We also see that the consumer price, other things
equal, is increasing in newspaper taxes; @pi=@ > 0. Apparently, this lends support
to a public policy of imposing low ad-valorem taxes on newspapers in order to reduce
their prices.
Stage 2. At the second stage each platform sells advertising space. Substituting
equations (4) and (6) into (5) and solving @i=@ai = 0; we nd that the prot-
maximizing advertising volume equals
ai =
  cA (1 + T )
2
: (7)
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From (7) we see that the level of advertising (ai) is decreasing in the ad-valorem tax
T; but increasing in the size of the advertising market (). Making use of equation
(7) in (4), we can rewrite total advertising prot for each platform as
Ai =
[  cA (1 + T )]2
4 (1 + T ) 
Di: (8)
Using equations (5) and (8) we can now derive revenue per readerRi of each platform
as
Ri =

pi
1 + 
  cN

+
[  cA (1 + T )]2
4 (1 + T ) 
;
where it is useful to note that revenue per reader falls following a rise in either of
the two ad-valorem tax rates.10
Stage 1. At the rst stage the two media platforms choose their proles and
investments in journalism. The rst-order conditions are found by solving @i =@xi =
@i =@ji = 0 (i = 1; 2), where 

i denotes prots given optimal prices and ad levels.
Starting with each newspapers choice of prole (horizontal dimension), we note
that
di
dxi
=

pi
1 + 
  cN
2664
direct e¤ectz}|{
@Di
@xi
+
strategic e¤ectz }| {
@Di
@p i
dp i
dxi
3775
| {z }
(I) Reader market (-)
+
@Ai
@Di
dDi
dxi| {z }
(II) Ad market (+)
: (9)
Terms (I) and (II) in equation (9) measure the marginal prot for newspaper i
in the reader and ad market, respectively, of choosing a prole which is closer to
that of the rival. Following the convention in the Hotelling literature, the two terms
in the square bracket of equation (9) are labelled the direct and the strategic e¤ect,
respectively. The direct e¤ect is positive, other things equal, and captures the fact
that the newspaper increases its market share by moving closer to its rival. However,
the price charged by the rival is lower the smaller the distance between the rms
(dp i=dxi < 0), so the strategic e¤ect is negative.
It is well known from the Principle ofMaximum Di¤erentiation that the strategic
e¤ect dominates over the demand e¤ect (e.g. Tirole, 1988). Thus, expression (I)
10It is easily veried that @Ri ( ; T ) =@ < 0 and @Ri ( ; T ) =@T < 0.
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in equation (9) is negative. Expression (II), on the other hand, is positive (see
Appendix for a proof). The reason is that the newspaper gets a larger readership
and consequently earns higher prot in the ad market if it moves closer to its rival. A
large ad market may therefore give rise to the Principle ofMinimum Di¤erentiation,
as discussed by Gabszewicz et al (2001, 2002).
Di¤erentiating prot with respect to investments in journalism (the vertical di-
mension) we nd
di
dji
=

pi
1 + 
  cN
2664
direct e¤ectz}|{
@Di
@ji
+
strategic e¤ectz }| {
@Di
@p i
dp i
dji
3775
| {z }
(I): Reader market (+)
+
@Ai
@Di
dDi
dji| {z }
(II): Ad market (+)
  ji: (10)
The square bracket in (10) shows that there is a direct and a strategic e¤ect also
for journalistic investments; demand for newspaper i increases if it invests more in
journalism, but the rival will respond by reducing its newspaper price. The latter
reduces the positive e¤ect of journalistic improvements, but the former e¤ect unam-
biguously dominates. Therefore Expression (I) in (10) is positive (see Appendix).
It is straightforward to show that also Expression (II) is positive. The reason is
that a higher investment level increases the size of the readership and thus revenue
from ad-inserts: formally, we have
@Ai
@Di
=

  ai
1 + T
  cA

ai > 0
and
dDi
dji
=
1
6t (1  x1   x2) > 0: (11)
Equation (11) contains the important message that dDi=dji is increasing in x1 and x2:
This means that the demand-expanding e¤ect of a given improvement in journalism
is larger if the newspapers are good substitutes than if they are poor substitutes.
The intuitive explanation is that the better substitutes the newspapers are, the
more prone consumers are to shift from a newspaper with a low journalistic quality
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to one with a high journalistic quality. As we shall see later, this gives rise to a
business-stealing e¤ect which implies that each newspaper has greater incentives to
make investments in journalism in order to capture readers from its rival the closer
the newspapers are located on the Hotelling line.
In order to characterize the optimal prole and investment level we set (9) and
(10) equal to zero. This yields the equilibrium conditions
xi =  
1
4
+
[  cA (1 + T )]2 (1 + )
16 (1 + T ) t
; (12)
and
ji =
4t (1 + T )
12t (1 + T )  [  cA (1 + T )]2 (1 + )
	
(1 + )
: (13)
For (12) and (13) to describe an equilibrium, the second-order condition for an
optimum must hold (see Appendix). In addition, we must impose a restriction on
the willingness to pay for advertising () which guarantees that xi 2 [0; 1=2]: This
restriction amounts to requiring
    ; (14)
  2
r
t(1 + T )
1 + 
+ cA(1 + T );
  2
r
3t (1 + T )
1 + 
+ cA (1 + T ) :
If demand for advertising is su¢ ciently small ( 6 ), equation (12) implies that
the newspapers will be located at each end of the Hotelling line. However, the larger
the advertising market, the closer the rms will locate to each other, and in the limit
when  approaches  we have xi = 1=2:
The advertisers do not care about the journalistic quality of the newspaper per
se; their only concern is the number of readers. The size of the ad market therefore
has no direct e¤ect on the rmsinvestment incentives. However, the newspapers
will be less di¤erentiated the larger the advertising market, and we know from
equation (11) that less horizontal di¤erentiation makes the business stealing motive
for investing in journalism stronger. From equation (13) it can therefore be veried
that ji is increasing in the size of the advertising market.
10
Summing up, we have:
Proposition 1 The newspapers will be less di¤erentiated but undertake larger in-
vestments in journalism the greater the size of the advertising market (dxi =d >
0; dxi =d < 0 and dj

i =d > 0; dj

i =d < 0).
The equilibrium values in the consumer and advertising markets are now found
by inserting for (12) and (13) into (2), (6) and (8):
pi =
3
2
t+ cN (1 + )  [  cA (1 + T )]
2 (1 + )
8 (1 + T )
; (15)
Ai =
[  cA (1 + T )]2
8 (1 + T )
: (16)
By inspecting equation (15) we may state:
Corollary 2 The newspaper price is decreasing in the size of the advertising market.
Corollary 2 reects the fact that each media rm is willing to accept a low
newspaper price in order to attract a larger number of readers when the advertising
market is very protable.
4 E¤ects of taxing media products
This section analyzes how higher ad-valorem taxes a¤ect the newspapersstrategic
choices. For this purpose, we treat locations, investments in journalism and newspa-
per prices as functions of the two exogenous tax rates, i.e., xi (); j

i (); p

i () where
 2 f ; Tg. Let us rst consider the newspaperschoice of location. From equation
(12) we nd that
dxi
d
=
[  cA (1 + T )]2
16t (1 + T )
> 0: (17)
Equation (17) reects the fact that higher ad-valorem taxes on newspapers make
the advertising market relatively more important for the media rms. Thereby it
becomes more valuable to aim for the mass market, inducing each newspaper to
locate closer to its competitor. This relocation e¤ect is clearly stronger the larger is
the advertising market (higher ; smaller ).
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To see what happens to the newspaper price if  goes up, we di¤erentiating
equation (15) and obtain
dpi
d
= cN   [  cA (1 + T )]
2
8 (1 + T )
: (18)
As in a one-sided market, the direct e¤ect of a higher  is to increase the newspaper
price if marginal costs are positive. This is captured by the rst term on the right-
hand side of (18). However, the fact that the newspapers endogenously become less
horizontally di¤erentiated when  increases, means that there will be tougher price
competition between the newspapers. This relocation e¤ect in turn tends to reduce
the newspaper price, as shown by the second term on the right-hand side of (18).
The net result depends on the relative strength of these two e¤ects and cannot
be signed in general. However, equation (18) shows that the relocation e¤ect is more
likely to dominate and lead to a price reduction the larger the advertising market.
Specically, it can be shown that dpi =d < 0 if  > 1  2
p
2 (1 + T ) cN +
cA (1 + T ). This condition holds always if marginal costs are equal to zero (cA =
cN = 0).
The consequences of a higher  for investments in journalism are also ambiguous.
On the one hand, the prot margin of the newspapers falls subsequent to a tax
increase, other things equal. This has a negative e¤ect on the incentives to invest
in journalism. On the other hand, we have seen that the newspapers will locate
closer to each other if  increases. To clearly see the implications of the latter for
investments in journalism, we di¤erentiate equation (13) and use (17) to nd
dji
d
= 3 (1 + )j2i

8
3
dxi
d
  1
1 + 

: (19)
The larger dxi =d ; the less di¤erentiated the newspapers will be, and the stronger
each newspapers incentive will be to invest in journalism in order to capture readers
from its rival (business-stealing e¤ect). This explains why the change in investments
is proportional to the relocation e¤ect. Since the relocation e¤ect in turn is stronger
the larger the advertising market, we nd that a higher newspaper tax increases
journalistic investments if the ad market is su¢ ciently large - combining equations
(17) and (19) - we have dji =d > 0 if  > 2 
q
6(1+T )t
1+
+ cA (1 + T ).
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We can now state:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the ad-valorem tax on newspapers increases. Then:
(a) the newspapers become less di¤erentiated ( dxi =d > 0),
(b) the newspaper price falls if  > 1 ( dpi =d < 0); and
(c) investments in journalism increases if  > 2 ( dji =d > 0).
Figure 2 provides a numerical illustration of Proposition 3. The size of the
advertising market is captured by  on the horizontal axis, and with the chosen
parameter values (see Appendix), we nd that dpi =d < 0 if  >
4
5
p
5  1:79: The
the upward-sloping curve shows that dji =d > 0 if  >
p
3  1:73:11 For  > 4
5
p
5 a
higher ad-valorem tax will thus reduce the newspaper price and increase investments
in journalism.
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
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1.70 1.72 1.74 1.76 1.78 1.80
a
*/dt
dpi*/
dji
dt
Figure 2: Value added taxes on newspapers: price and investment responses.
Finally, let us consider the e¤ects of increasing T . Higher ad-valorem taxes on
ads make the advertising market relatively less protable for the newspapers, and
will therefore lead to increased di¤erentiation:
dxi
dT
=  

2   c2A (1 + T )2

(1 + )
16t (1 + T )2
< 0:
11As shown by equation (17), xi is monotonically increasing in : For the parameter values used
in Figure 2, we have xi =  1=4 + 2=8: This means that xi = 0:111 at  = 1:7 and xi = 0:155 at
 = 1:8:
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How does the newspaper price depend on the tax level on ads? We have already
seen that pi is independent of T at the nal stage of the game; c.f. equation (6).
The newspaper price is nevertheless increasing in advertising taxes. This is due
to the relocation e¤ect: since the newspapers end up being more di¤erentiated if T
increases, the competitive pressure falls. This unambiguously allows the newspapers
to increase their prices. Additionally, the lower competitive pressure reduces the
newspapersincentive to invest in journalism. We therefore have
dpi
dT
=
(1 + ) [  cA(1 + T )] [2cA + (1 + T )]
1 + T
> 0;
dji
dT
=   4t

[  cA(1 + T )]2 + 2cA(1 + T )2
	


12t(1 + T )  [  cA(1 + T )]2 (1 + )
	 < 0:
The e¤ects of taxing advertising can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the ad valorem tax on ads increases. Then
(a) the newspapers become more di¤erentiated ( dxi =dT < 0),
(b) the newspaper price increases ( dpi =dT > 0), and
(c) investments in journalism fall ( dji =dT < 0).
Comparing Propositions 2 and 3 we see that the two taxes have very di¤erent
e¤ects. A reduction in the ad-valorem tax on newspapers (the reduced-rate regime
in many countries) makes each platform di¤erentiate its prole further. In contrast,
a fall in the tax on ads has the opposite e¤ect; it leads to less di¤erentiation. The
impact on journalistic investments and newspaper prices may also be of opposite
signs, but whether this is the case depends on the importance of advertising as a
source of revenue.
5 Concluding remarks
Newspapers are based on a two-sided business model where the newspaper creates
content that is used to attract readers. The more readers the newspapers get on
board, the more attractive it is for advertisers. We have demonstrated that this
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two-sidedness has a profound e¤ect on how tax policy a¤ects the strategic variables
of the newspapers. A main nding that emerges from our analysis is that a fall in
the ad valorem tax rate on newspapers implies that they become more di¤erentiated.
The reason is that a lower newspaper tax makes it more attractive for the media
rms to derive income from newspaper sales relative to selling advertising space. By
choosing a di¤erent prole from its competitor, the rm gains market power and
thus earns more revenue from the sale of the newspaper.
It is a well-known result from standard Hotelling models in one-sided markets
that product di¤erentiation, which in our context corresponds to media pluralism,
can be excessive compared to social optimum. This benchmark result should be
contrasted with the literature on truth telling, which shows that media diversity
might foster truth telling (see Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008). It is then clear that
there are two di¤erent e¤ects at hand and it is not a simple matter to console the
traditional Industrial Organization (IO) view of too much di¤erentiation with the
benets of truth telling. The latter seems to indicate that media pluralism and even
polarization past the social optimum in standard IO models is good. It is certainly a
challenge for future research to try and bring together these two strands of research
in a unied framework.
6 Appendix
Proof that @Ai
@Di
dDi
dxi
> 0 (equation (9))
Di¤erentiating equation (8) with respect to Di we nd that
@Ai
@Di
=

  ai
1 + T
  cA

ai: (20)
Inserting (6) into (2) it further follows that
dDi
dxi
=
1
6
t (1  x1   x2)2   ji + j i
t (1  x1   x2)2
:
In a symmetric equilibrium (xi = x i and ji = j i) we consequently have
@Ai
@Di
dDi
dxi

sym
=

  ai
1 + T
  cA

ai
6
> 0:
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Proof that @

i
@ji
> 0 (equation (10))
Di¤erentiating i with respect to ji and using the envelope theorem (which implies
that @i
@pi
@pi
@ji
= 0) we have
@i
@ji
=

p1
1 + 
  cN

@Di
@ji
+
@Di
@p i
dp i
dji

+
@Ai
@Di
dDi
dji
  ji: (21)
We further nd 
@Di
@ji
+
@Di
@p i
dp i
dji

sym
=
1
3t (1  2xi) > 0
and
@Ai
@Di
dDi
dji

sym
=

  a1
1 + T
  cA

ai
2t (1  2xi) > 0:
The two rst terms on the right-hand side of (10) are thus positive. Q.E.D.
Second-order conditions
The second-order conditions for the third and the second stage are straightforwardly
calculated. However, the second-order conditions for the rst stage are more complex
(and will obviously not be satised if  is too small), and require that
@2i
@j2i
=  9t (1 + ) (1  x1   x2)  1
9 (1 + ) t (1  x1   x2) < 0; (22)
0 >
@2i
@x2i
=  
(
t2 (5 + 3xi   x i) (1  x1   x2)3 (1 + T )
9t (1 + ) (1  x1   x2)3 (1 + T )
(23)
 (ji   j i)
 
4 (1 + T ) (ji   j i)  3 (  cA (1 + T ))2 (1 + )

36t (1 + ) (1  x1   x2)3 (1 + T )
)
and 
@2i
@j2i

@2i
@x2i

 

@2i
@ji@xi
2
> 0 (24)
where
@2i
@ji@xi
2
=
 
8 (1 + T )
 
(ji   j i) + t (1  x1   x2)2

+ 3 (A  cN (1 + T ))2 (1 + )
2
5184 (1 + )2 t2 (1  x1   x2)4 (1 + T )2 2
:
(25)
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A necessary condition for the second-order conditions to be satised is that  >
[9t (1 + ) (1  x1   x2)] 1 : Otherwise, the costs of investing in journalism are so
low that @2i=@j2i is non-negative.
Parameter values Parameter values in Figure 2: T =  = cN = 0; t = 1=2;  =
2; cA = 4=10 and  = 1: Using equations (22) - (25) it can be veried that all
second-order conditions are satised within the range of  shown in the gure.
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